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Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in Environmental Policy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The principle of subsidiarity has become more widely known with its prominent adop-
tion in the Maastricht Treaty. The principle is, however, deeply embedded in the 
history of political economy, notably in the continental European tradition. In this 
tradition, it has the status of a principle in constitutional political economy, i.e. it is a 
principle that affects policy design as opposed to policy choice. This article emphasizes 
the constitutional political economy aspect of the principle and illustrates its useful-
ness with respect to environmental policy design. 
 
 
JEL codes: H10, K10, Q20, Q30 
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Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in Environmental Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
The principle of subsidiarity, since it became part of the treaty of Maastricht and 
thereby of European constitutional law, has received a lot of attention. Its relationship 
to ecological issues, however, has to my knowledge rarely been explored. Subsidiarity 
is a perfectly generalizable principle of organization. It can apply to all areas of policy, 
financial, agricultural, technological, education, defense, economic development and, 
of course, environmental policy. The principle of subsidiarity is an organizing principle. 
Taken as such, it is silent about the specific purpose, direction or content of a particular 
policy. Whatever be the purpose of the policy, the principle of subsidiarity requires that 
it be carried out within that context which is the smallest viable one in which the 
objective can successfully be attained. When a task is too complicated for a small unit 
such as an office or a firm to be successfully performed, that unit has to be augmented 
to the point where the task can be effectively performed. Likewise, if an organization is 
too large to successfully handle particular problems as its procedures may be too 
cumbersome, as it lacks sufficient detailed information or experiences repeated recur-
rence of problems it once has tried to settle, then a different organizational form must 
be found, preferably an existing one, which is closer to the problem at hand and able 
to carry out the policy at hand. It goes without saying that with the shift in responsi-
bility will also travel the access to resources with which to carry out the task. 
 
 
1. Aspirations and Policy Goals: Enforced and Selfenforcing Rules and Policies 
In constitutional economics, we can distinguish between different types of 
approaches, notably those that need to be enforced and those that are designed to be 
selfenforcing. Given the difficulties enforcement agencies have in enforcing rules laid 
down and sometimes agreed to beforehand, there is always a preference for self-
enforcing rules. 
 
Rules have a better chance of being self-enforcing if there is a close match between 
the functions of a particular unit and the means and responsibilities to serve this 
function, where the rules have the purpose to ensure a proper use of the means and 
responsibilities with a view to performing the functions in question. The crucial issue 
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then is to define that unit which is most appropriate for fulfilling a particular function. 
Very often in constitutional public choice, this question is not addressed head on. 
Typically, we start from the assumption that there be a state or a commonwealth, 
without exploring the question of which domain this commonwealth or state should 
actually occupy, and in relation to what other public bodies. Therefore, the first section 
of part 2 is devoted to an in-depth discussion of the subsidiarity principle. It is shown, 
in particular, that the principle has a strong history in European thought, and that it 
therefore deserves to be systematically relied upon in constitutional economics.  
 
 
2. Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity has earned a solid position in European intellectual 
history. Since due to its incorporation into the Maastricht treaty1 it has become inter-
national law, it is worth briefly retracing its intellectual history. 
 
2.1. Historical Context and Theory 
This short section tries to clarify the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity - which is 
far from unambiguous - and to explain some of its implications in the context of Euro-
pean unification and the accompanying legal discourse.  
 
Perhaps one of the earliest formulations of the principle of subsidiarity, which is at the 
same time one of the first formulations of a full scale state welfare program, can be 
found in Christian Wolff's Principles of Natural Law, published in 1754. There, in ' 1022, 
he states the following: 
In order to lead one's life with decency, it is necessary, that the destitute 
and the beggars be provided with what they basically need, and that there-
fore the subjects will not be burdened with too much charitable giving. It 
has to be carefully determined what the natural law prescribes for charity. 
Houses of order are to be established where those can work who, although 
they are able to work would rather prefer to keep begging. Similarly, houses 
for the destitute need to be established, where those will be fed who 
                                                                
1 The most detailed statement of the principle can be found in article 3 B (2) of the EC Treaty: 
In some areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence, the community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objective of 
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cannot work for their own livelihood, and who have no relatives or friends 
who could take care of their needs: also hospitals, where the destitute poor 
will be fed and sometimes cured. Likewise orphanages, where poor orphans 
be educated: and finally schools for the destitute, where the children of 
poor parents will be taught for free in those matters, that are necessary and 
useful for them.2 3 
 
Several elements of this exposition are particularly noteworthy. This is first of all the 
scope of the program of the welfare state, including measures in order to alleviate the 
consequences of sickness, unemployment, poor health, orphanage and more generally 
poverty, in which case access to public schools is guaranteed. Yet the rationale for this 
government welfare program, as Wolff explicitly states, is to keep the burden of the 
welfare taxes to be borne by citizens at a minimum. The welfare state intervenes if and 
because this is the least expensive way to alleviate the problem. Equally noteworthy is 
the precise circumscription of the instance under which the welfare state has to inter-
vene, i.e. if the person in need has no "relatives or friends who can take on the satisfac-
tion of his needs". The welfare state, therefore, is only subsidiary to the traditional 
bonds of family and friendship. Yet it would be wrong to think of the principle of 
subsidiarity as conceived by Christian Wolff as one built around individualism. It is not 
the individual which is considered the smallest unit of support (of others), since that 
would not have been a realistic description of the political economy of his time. Rather, 
Wolff puts forth a different economic constitution of his welfare state, with the big 
households comprehending the extended family as the nuclear entity of which the 
larger economy is composed: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefor, by 
means of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the community. 
2 "Das Leben gehörig hinzubringen, wird auch erfordert, dass man vor die Dürftige und Bettler 
besorge, was zur Notdurft des Lebens nötig ist, und, damit die Untertanen nicht gar zu sehr 
mit Almosen geben beschwert werden, ist in sorgfältige Betrachtung zu ziehen, was das 
Naturgesetz von den Almosen feste setzt (' 488.sequ.). Daher sind Zuchthäuser aufzubauen, 
worin diejenigen zur Arbeit angehalten werden müssen, welche, ob sie gleich Arbeiten könn-
ten, doch lieber betteln wollen; ingleichen Armenhäuser, worin man die dürftigen ernährt, die 
sich durch Arbeiten das nicht zu erwerben im Stande sind, was sie zur Lebensnotdurft gebrau-
chen, und keine Anverwandten oder Freunde haben, welche sich ihrer Bedürfnisse annehmen 
könnten; noch ferner Krankenhäuser, worin kranke Arme teils ernährt, teils geheilt werden; So 
auch Waisenhäuser, worin man arme Waisen erzieht; endlich Armenschulen, in welchen man 
die Kinder armer Eltern umsonst in demjenigen unterrichtet, was ihnen zu wissen nötig und 
nützlich ist." 
3 Christian Freiherr von Wolff, Grundsätze des Natur- und Völckerrechts. Halle: Renger, 1754, 
III, 2.1. 
 6 
It can be readily seen that single houses cannot sufficiently provide them-
selves with what gives satisfaction of needs, comfort, and pleasure, in fact 
even what is needed for their welfare, nor can they safely profit from their 
rights and from what they can rightfully expect from others, nor can they 
be sure to protect themselves against the violence of others. It is therefor, 
necessary, to provide through common forces what single houses cannot 
get by themselves. For this purpose societies have to be formed ('836).4 5 
 
We realize then, that in Wolff's conception the principle supporting the unit of the 
welfare state was the house, i.e. the classical household or micro-economy; only if it 
failed, a larger politico-economic unit had to intervene. The interesting question then 
is what form this intervention was supposed to take. The answer is already implicit in 
Wolff, but a more explicit statement can be found in the writings of another authority 
on political thought in continental Europe writing about a hundred years after Wolff: 
Of course, from the need to have anyone provided with basic necessities, it 
follows by no means that it is the state that has to do the providing. To the 
contrary, the state will look at this need as it does at any other demand on 
the part of his citizens. In particular, the state has to lend a helping hand 
through policing and regulating if this cannot be accomplished through 
private efforts. As a rule, this will not be necessary if the general provisions 
have been taken that allow the citizens to earn income and wealth and to 
use their means effectively.6 7  
 
                                                                
4 ' 972. "Wir erkennen sehr leicht, dass einzelne Häuser sich selbst dasjenige nicht hinreichend 
verschaffen können, was zur Notdurft, Bequemlichkeit und dem Vergnügen, ja zur Glückselig-
keit erfordert wird, noch auch ihre Rechte ruhig genießen, und was sie von andern zu fordern 
haben, sicher erhalten, noch auch sich und das ihrige wider anderer Gewalttätigkeit schützen 
können. Es ist also nötig, dasjenige durch gemeinschaftliche Kräfte zu erhalten, was einzelne 
Häuser vor sich nicht erhalten können. Und zu dem Ende müssen Gesellschaften errichtet 
werden (' 836)." 
5 Wolff 1754, III, 2.1. 
6 "Natürlich folgt aus dieser Notwendigkeit des Besitzes genügender Lebensbedürfnisse noch 
keineswegs, dass sie gerade der Staat zu liefern habe. Im Gegenteil wird er sich zu diesem 
Bedürfnis wie zu jedem anderen Verlangen seiner Bürger verhalten. Er hat also namentlich 
polizeiliche Hilfe nur dann zu gewähren, wenn bei der größeren Allgemeinheit eines Bedürf-
nisses auch die Unmöglichkeit vorliegt, dasselbe mittels Privatanstrengung zu befriedigen. 
Und in der Regel wird Letzteres nicht der Fall sein, wenn die allgemeinen Maßregeln zur Erwer-
bung von Vermögen gehörig getroffen sind und benützt werden." 
7 Robert von Mohl, Die Polizeiwissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates, Tübingen, 
1844 (2), pp. 265-266. 
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In brief, Mohl suggests that the mere existence of needs of its citizens are an insuffi-
cient reason for the state to directly satisfy those needs. In general, the state, rather 
than satisfying needs of its citizens directly has the task to create the conditions under 
which the citizens can accumulate sufficient wealth in order to satisfy their needs 
themselves. Note that this application of the principle is twofold, and twice correct. On 
the one hand, Mohl correctly identifies the state as the better provider of the (mostly 
legal) infrastructure which allows its citizens to prosper and accumulate wealth in 
order to satisfy the needs of themselves and their dependants. He correctly assumes 
that the provision by the state will detract from this objective, since the provision by 
the individual households will be more cost effective than the provision by the state 
which would, by necessity, have to be financed through taxes to be borne by the tax 
paying households. Consequently, the state is responsible for providing the 
infrastructure in which the individual households can prosper. Since, on the other 
hand, provision of welfare services and the satisfaction of needs can be better targeted 
and more effectively rendered by the (larger) households, it is to them that the task 
also falls, relieving them of the otherwise necessary tax burden. In applying the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, it is of pivotal importance to continuously consider both sides of the 
coin, the expenditure side and the revenue side. The determination of the primary and 
the subsidiary service entity can only be accomplished if both expenditure and revenue 
factors have been properly and completely taken into account. 
 
A more recent and perhaps the most widely read formulation of the principle of 
subsidiarity is contained in a Papal letter (encyclic) named after the two beginning 
Latin words Quadrogesimo anno in section 79 of the encyclic of 1931. The text reads: 
And since what an individual can accomplish through his own initiative 
must not be taken away from him and accorded as a collective task to the 
state, so similarly it violates the principle of justice that the bigger and 
higher authority claim a task that smaller communities can accomplish 
well. This would be extremely disadvantageous and confusing for the entire 
social order. Every social activity, to be sure, is subsidiary by its own nature 
and on its own terms. It is supposed to support the different organs of the 
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bigger social body, which however may not absorb or destroy the smaller 
entities.8 9 
 
In this formulation, the subsidiarity principle appears rather matter-of-factly as a 
restatement of an old principle in political theory and also church doctrine. Secondly, it 
receives an organic twist which blurs its sound economic interpretation. If a commu-
nity can reasonably discharge its duties, a larger community (of which it is conceivably 
a part) should not take over these duties as a matter of (ethical) principle. In this 
formulation, no mention is made of the costs and benefits to the larger and the 
smaller community respectively, nor to the costs and benefits facing other smaller 
communities being part of the larger whole. It is not surprising that the formulation 
from the encyclic, rather than the traditional formulation, has given rise to much 
controversy and contradictory applications.  
 
Yet the economic core of the principle is readily crystallized. In order to optimize the 
performance of the larger political entity, primary liability for the solution of problems 
lies with the smallest functional unit. This need not be the lowest functional unit in a 
hierarchical sense. This smallest functional unit can be a single unit or a group of such 
units as shown in the quote from Wolff, these units can be linked by friendship, 
neighborhood, a common religion, history or some other such link. The concept of 
joining several small units may be referred to as lateral subsidiarity.  
 
In the clear case of insufficiency of a particular level, the nearest functional one needs 
to be found. The search can go either up or down, depending on where one starts. If a 
particular province e.g., cannot adequately solve e.g. an environmental problem, it 
might look at a co-operation with: a) another province (lateral subsidiarity), or b) the 
nation state or the European Community (upwards subsidiarity), or c) the local 
communities inside the province, where the problem is most urgent (downwards). The 
                                                                
8 "Wie dasjenige, was der Einzelmensch aus eigener Initiative und in seinen eigenen Kräften 
leisten kann, ihm nicht entzogen und der Gesellschaftstätigkeit zugewiesen werden darf, so 
verstößt es gegen die Gerechtigkeit, das, was die kleineren und untergeordneten Gemein-
wesen leisten und zum guten Ende führen können, für die weitere und übergeordnete 
Gemeinschaft in Anspruch zu nehmen; zugleich ist es überaus nachteilig und verwirrt die 
ganze Gesellschaftsordnung. Jedweder Gesellschaftstätigkeit ist ja ihrem Wesen und Begriff 
nach subsidiär; sie soll die Glieder des Sozialkörpers unterstützen, darf sie aber niemals 
zerschlagen oder aufsaugen." 
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situation might arise where the provincial government takes care of the environ-
mental problem for the smaller communities, whereas the larger communities or 
those where the environmental problem is most urgent take the matter into their own 
hands. 
 
It should be emphasized that this principle provides a pattern of thought in order to 
delineate public responsibilities. The historical survey shows the principle of subsidi-
arity to be a long standing constitutional principle which actually dates back to the 
very beginnings of constitution writing based on natural law systems. The natural law 
source also makes the principle an integral part of church teachings. In its original 
formulation, the principle of subsidiarity is a constitutional principle determining the 
definition and delineation of rights and responsibilities of private bodies on the one 
hand and public bodies on the other. This is, e.g. still the case for the role of the princi-
ple in the German Basic Law (article two). In the Maastricht Treaty, the principle 
primarily (but not exclusively) is used to define the relative responsibilities of the 
European Communities on the one hand and member states or parts of member states 
(in the German and Belgian case federal states or 'gewesten') on the other. In the tug 
of war between the community and the member states, where the community tries to 
expand its programs while these attempts are sometimes met with resistance on the 
part of at least some of the member states or parts thereof, the principle has assumed 
a substantial importance. It is enforceable and regularly enforced.10 
 
In brief we can interpret the principle of subsidiarity as an economic principle of func-
tional organization. First, the function needs to be clearly defined. Secondly, that 
organizational unit needs to be defined in terms of a constitutional economic analysis 
determining which unit can best fulfil this function. A third step will necessarily consist 
in finding a legal counterpart to the organizational unit defined in this way. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
9 Cited after Roman Herzog, "Subsidäritätsprinzip und Staatsverfassung". Der Staat, 3, 1963, 
pp. 339-423 (400).  
10 I am, however, not aware of any rulings on the part of the European court of justice. There is 
extensive jurisdiction by the German constitutional court in Karlsruhe.  
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2.2. Lateral Subsidiarity 
Perhaps the most difficult concept in this context is the notion of lateral subsidiarity. 
All minds are trained to think in terms of analogies and parallels, and it is difficult to 
conceive of putting bodies of different legal and political status together into one 
common co-operation. Yet, in the environmental context where historical and political 
developments transcend geographical and ecological reasons, such cooperations with 
a binding legal form are perfectly normal. By way of example, the Lake of Constance is 
a condominium of one republic (Austrian), two federal German states (Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg), and the Swiss canton of Thurgau. In cooperations between 
highly centralized countries such as France or the Netherlands and highly 
decentralized countries such as Belgium and Germany, many lateral forms of 
subsidiarity can develop. 
 
3. Subsidiarity and Environmental Policy Design 
The area of environmental policy is vexed with design issues, since environmental 
problems rarely correspond to political jurisdictions which could be the locus of policy 
formation and execution. Consider a river basin. A river and its tributaries can origi-
nate in distant locations that are extremely remote from the site of the river mouth or 
delta, where the river tends to be an important economic factor, typically the site of a 
harbor. Consider the Danube river. Two very small rivers, the Brigach and Breg come 
together at Donaueschingen, at 2,850km from the Danube's entry into the Black Sea. 
Meanwhile, the river disappears altogether under the surface and even contributes 
part of its water to the river Rhine. It becomes an economic factor with important 
navigation still in Germany, provides hydro-electric power and regulation in the com-
mon and controversial Slovak-Hungarian project and then clearly dominates the land-
scape and livelihood along its course. Countries with very different economic systems 
and economic styles are being connected, the river basin is partly within the European 
Union, partly within countries that are likely to accede to the European Union rela-
tively soon and partly in countries that are less likely to do so in the foreseeable future. 
Not only are the issues raised for environmental policy with respect to the river basin 
of the Danube very varied; so are the political jurisdictions that would have to be 
responsible for formulating such policies. 
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Alternatively, consider mountain ranges. Typically, ecological conditions can be drasti-
cally different on either side of the mountain range, as the mountain ranges tend to 
also serve as climatic divides. Climatic divides will typically also be responsible for eco-
nomic, cultural, social, historical and any number of other differences. Thirdly, consider 
water reservoirs. They can be large and underground, subterraneous under many 
different jurisdictions. Alternatively, they can be at the surface and have for thousands 
of years divided entire civilizations. With modern technologies, this is now rapidly 
changing, implying that traditional forms of decision-making, reflecting as they do 
historical technological constraints may be due for an overhaul. In the case of the 
oceans, this is clearly important for international maritime law which no longer is 
merely an issue of war or peace and the freedom of international trade. Fourthly, 
climate units comprise different continents and, by implication, different jurisdictions, 
economic, political and cultural systems. Fifthly, cultural ensembles as expressions of 
the man-made environment defy attempts at designing effective jurisdictions as they 
necessarily involve the interests of many different generations, who all contributed or 
participate differently in the cultural heritage. 
 
Given these daunting tasks of environmental policy design, the principle of subsidiarity 
plays a crucial role in defining an appropriate body or mechanism or decision rule by 
which a particular policy area with respect to a particular environmental entity, such 
as a river basin, a mountain range, a water reservoir, a climate unit or a cultural 
ensemble can be tackled. We need to start with a clear definition of the function that a 
set of policies is supposed to fulfil, such as the sustainable development in the interest 
of all citizens forming part of a river basin. Then one needs to identify those entities 
which can most effectively discharge of this function in their respective part of the 
river basin. Thirdly, one needs to assemble all these entities into a concert of decision-
making so as to be able to design a coherent policy framework in which the function 
then can be discharged by the singular elements. It is possible, even likely, that deci-
sions will have to be taken at different echelons or with respect to different policy 
areas carved out of the general one. The principle of subsidiarity will thus serve to 
constitute the framework in which for any given ecological entity policy design can 
take place. In this, the principle is a constitutional principle in political economy, 
serving to create competencies for policy design. 
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Conclusion 
In this article the principle of subsidiarity has been developed as an organization prin-
ciple to be used in constitutional environmental economics. Constitutional economics 
is that part of economics in which we try to set out the structures in which decision 
making processes with respect to ecological units can take place. The principle of 
subsidiarity has been shown to help in defining relevant organizational units in which 
political decision making can take place in order to ensure an efficient and sustainable 
management of specific units. 
 
It is by no means unusual that a central government may have to cooperate with a 
state government (such as between the Netherlands and the state of North Rhine 
Westphalia, were such cooperations are common between The Hague and Düsseldorf), 
a district or even a county or city. In Switzerland and Belgium, many tasks which are 
normally reserved for the central government fall to the canton (Switzerland) or de 
gewest (Belgium). Germany has a traditional system, since the reforms by Stein and 
Hardenberg in the first decade of the 19th century, emphasizing local independence 
and responsibility, even the residual right of taxation. It is true that central govern-
ments are often reluctant to enter into consultations with foreign governments at 
lower levels. But this is what the principle of subsidiarity requires. Logically the subsidi-
arity principle requires the co-operation of the smallest viable units, and if a country 
does not provide for local authority, that authority has to be found at which ever is the 
lowest level. In highly centralized countries such as France and the Netherlands, the 
principle of subsidiarity will therefore point towards the center, whereas in highly 
decentralized countries such as Belgium, Germany and Switzerland it points to local 
bodies.  
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